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Gerber: Borden Ranch Partnership v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers: A Barge

BORDEN RANCH PARTNERSHIP V US. ARMY CORPS OF
ENGINEERS: A BARGE IN A BUCKET? MAY ISOLATED
WETLANDS BE CONSIDERED "NAVIGABLE WATERS"
UNDER THE CWA?
I.

INTRODUCTION

The quality of our nation's oceans, rivers and streams is regulated by the Federal Clean Water Act (CWA). Currently, there are
approximately 1.9 million farms in the United States that provide
2
food sources for the United States and large parts of the world.
Approximately eighty-six percent of these farms are owned and
operated by individuals or single families.3 The interests of these
small farmers recently came into conflict with the CWA in Borden
Ranch Partnershipv. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Borden).4
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Army
Corps of Engineers (Corps) are the regulatory agencies responsible
for implementing the CWA. 5 These agencies have traditionally enjoyed a broad range of powers to enforce the CWA in the nation's
"navigable" waters. 6 These powers were recently challenged in Bor1. Clean Water Act § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (2001) (stating CWA's goals
and policies). Congress passed the CWA in 1972 to "restore and maintain the
chemical, physical and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." Id.
2. See United States Department of Agriculture, National Agriculture Statistics
Service, Quick Facts, Census Count of Farms: 1969-1997, at http://www.nass.usda.gov/
census/census97/quickfacts/page3a.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2004). The 2002 census is scheduled to be released in the spring of 2004. United States Department of
Agriculture, National Agriculture Statistics Service, Scheduled Release Dates for 2002
Census of Agriculture Products, at http://www.nass.usda.gov/census/census02/preliminary/2002censusdates.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2004).
3. See United States Department of Agriculture, National Agriculture Statistics
Service, Quick Facts, Farm Ownership: 1969-1997, at http://www.nass.usda.gov/census/census97/quickfacts/page8.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2004) (detailing ownership of farms).
4. Borden Ranch P'ship v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 261 F.3d 810
(9th Cir. 2001). For a complete discussion of the facts and holdings of Borden see
infra, notes 20-44 and 92-122 and accompanying text.
5. Clean Water Act § 404(a), 33 U.S.C. 1344(a), (d) (2001) (granting power
to Army Corps to enforce CWA).
6. See generally Arthur F. Coon, Is Plowing a Point Source Discharge?, 18 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T, 6 (Summer 2003) (explaining that Borden was attempt by
farmers to defend their rights against regulation by Corps and EPA). See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1344(a) (granting secretary authority to regulate "discharge of dredged or fill
material into the navigable waters at specified disposal sites"). Section 1344(d)
defines Secretary as "the secretary of the Army, acting through the Chief of Engineers." Id. at § 1344(d).
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den.7 At issue in Borden was the authority of the Corps and EPA to
regulate a plowing technique called "deep ripping."8 Deep ripping
is a process in which a tractor or bulldozer drags long metal prongs
through the ground, penetrating layers of soil in order to drain the
land and allow certain crops to grow.9 Borden rose to prominence
within the agricultural community because of its implications for
regulating deep ripping and other plowing techniques employed by
10
farmers across the country.
In Borden, the Ninth Circuit dealt with two important issues:
(1) whether "deep ripping" is within the regulatory authority of the
Corps and EPA; and (2) whether isolated wetlands are "navigable
waters" under the CWA. 1 1 The Ninth Circuit held that the Corps
and EPA had the power to regulate deep ripping, but concluded
that the Corps' and EPA's jurisdiction did not extend to certain
isolated pools. 12 An equally divided United States Supreme Court
3
later affirmed this decision without a written opinion.'
This Note examines the extent to which the Corps and EPA
may regulate deep ripping and the limits of the federal government's jurisdiction under the CWA. 14 Section II presents the facts
and procedural history of Borden.15 Section III examines the origins
of the power of the Corps and EPA to regulate farmers' actions in

7. See Borden, 261 F.3d at 812 (providing background facts of case).
8. See id. at 812 (explaining agricultural activity in controversy).
9. See id. (describing deep ripping process). For a more complete discussion
of the facts of Borden, see infra notes 20-44 and accompanying text.
10. See Coon, supra note 6, at 6 (noting farmers and ranchers nationwide are
.now on notice that the Corps claims the right to regulate their most basic agricultural activities").
11. See Borden, 261 F.3d at 812 (setting forth issues examined in case). For a
more complete discussion of the holding and reasoning in Borden, see infra notes
92-122 and accompanying text.
12. See id. at 816, 819 (holding Corps' authority did not extend to certain
non-navigable pools).
13. Borden Ranch P'ship v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs., 537 U.S. 99
(2002) (per curiam) (affirming holding of Ninth Circuit with Justice Kennedy abstaining). Such a split decision, issued without formal written opinion, has precedential value only in the jurisdiction where the case originated. See Coon, supra
note 6, at 6. Justice Kennedy abstained because he is from California, where the
land is located, and is an acquaintance of the developer of the land, Angelo Tsakopoulos. See Deep Plowing Not Allowed, 82 FARM BuREAu NEws: Capital Update, (Jan.
2003) Vol. 82 No.1, available at http://www.fb.com/news/fbn/03/01_06/htmli/
deepplowing.html (discussing implications of holding).
14. For a more complete discussion, see infra notes 123-56 and accompanying
text.
15. For a discussion of the facts of Borden, see infra notes 20-44 and accompanying text.
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wetlands. 16 Section IV reviews the Ninth Circuit's holding and reasoning in Borden.i" Section V offers a critical analysis of the Ninth
Circuit's decision to extend authority to the Corps and EPA to regulate deep ripping. 18 Finally, Section VI discusses Borden's potential
impact on the farming community.' 9
II.

FACTS

The controversy in Borden arose from a long-standing dispute
between the Corps, EPA and real estate developer Angelo Tsakopoulos. 20 In June of 1993, Tsakopoulos purchased Borden Ranch,
an 8,400 acre ranch located in California's Central Valley, with the
intent of turning the ranchland into a vineyard and orchard.2 ' To
develop the land, Tsakopoulos needed to penetrate the ranchland's
shallow surface to allow the deep root systems of the vineyard and
orchard to grow. 22 To accomplish this goal, he deep ripped the
soil.23

Tsakopoulos first began deep ripping the land without a permit in the fall of 1993.24 The Corps later discovered the deep ripping on what they perceived to be protected "wetlands." 25 The
Corps issued Tsakopoulos a retrospective permit in 1994 subject to
certain damage-mitigating requirements. 2 6 When Tsakopoulos be16. For a discussion of the origins and authority of the Corps' power under
the CWA, see infra notes 45-91 and accompanying text.
17. For further discussion of the holding and reasoning in Borden, see infra
notes 92-122 and accompanying text.
18. For a critical analysis of the boundaries of the government's commerce
powers, see infra notes 144-56 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of the effects of the Ninth Circuit's holding in Borden, see
infra notes 157-66 and accompanying text.
20. See Borden, 261 F.3d at 812-13 (discussing origins of dispute in Borden). By
the time this case reached the Supreme Court, the underlying dispute in Borden
had been developing for nearly a decade. Id.
21. See id. at 812 (noting developer's intent to convert land into vineyard and
sell it in smaller parcels).
22. See id. (describing process of deep ripping). Deep ripping loosens the soil
and allows the water to drain down into the soil to "feed the deeper roots of vineyards and orchards, effectively destroying the water-retaining characteristic of the
land that defines it as a wetland." Adrienne Kovalsky, On the Docket: Borden Ranch
Partnership v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, http://journalism.medill.northwestern.
edu/docket/action.lasso?-database=docket&-layout=lasso&-response=%2fdocket%
2fdetail.srch&-recordlD=33082&-search (last visited Mar. 25, 2004) (briefing Supreme Court's holding in Borden).
23. See Borden, 261 F.3d at 812 (describing deep ripping process employed by
Tsakopoulos).
24. See id. (providing background facts of case).
25. See id. (noting Corps' first attempt at regulating deep ripping activity).
26. See id. (detailing Corps' first action against Tsakopoulos).
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gan to deep rip again in 1995, the Corps issued a cease-and-desist
order. 27 Over the next year, Tsakopoulos repeatedly defied the
Corps' attempts to stop his deep ripping activities. 28 Finally, in
1996, the Corps, EPA and Tsakopoulos entered into an Administrative Consent Order.2 9 The Order required Tsakopoulos to reserve
1368 acres of the land for an environmental preserve and to "refrain from further violations." 30 In December of 1996, the Corps
also issued a regulatory guidance letter that distinguished deep ripping from normal plowing and stated that deep ripping required a
31
permit under the CWA.
In the spring of 1997, EPA investigators visited the ranch because they suspected that Tsakopoulos was still deep ripping the
soil.32 Upon their arrival, the inspectors witnessed "fully engaged

deep rippers passing over the jurisdictional wetlands. ' 33 Consequently, EPA issued an Administrative Order, compelling Tsakopoulos to cease his activities. 34 Tsakopoulos responded by initiating
35
a lawsuit against the Corps.
Tsakopoulos directly challenged the jurisdiction of the Corps
and EPA to regulate deep ripping on his land. 36 In response, the

United States filed a counterclaim for injunctive relief and civil pen27. See id. at 813. The Corps concluded that Tsakopoulos had been conducting further deep ripping on protected wetlands. See id. The specific features
deemed to be part of the "wetland" were vernal pools, swales and intermittent
drainages. Id. at 812. The Ninth Circuit defined vernal pools as "pools that form
during the rainy season, but are often dry in the summer." Id. It defined swales as
"sloped wetlands that allow for the movement of aquatic plant and animal life and
that filter water flows and minimizes erosion." Id. Finally, it defined intermittent
drainages as "streams that transport water during and after rains." Id.
28. See Borden, 261 F.3d at 813 (noting Tsakopoulos's continuation of deep
ripping). The Corps initiated a number of actions against Tsakopoulos, all to no
avail. See id.
29. See id. (giving history of violations).
30. See id. (providing background facts of case).
31. See id. (noting issuance of regulatory guidance letter). The Corps' guidance letter was "[i]n conflict with.., two decades of regulations and guidance."
See Coon, supra note 6, at 39.
32. Borden, 261 F.3d at 813 (noting EPA's involvement in case). The investigators accused Tsakopoulos of over 300 separate violations. See id.
33. Id. (noting investigators' observations of repeated violations of their guidance letter).
34. See id. (explaining EPA's actions after observing Tsakopoulos's violations).
35. See id. (noting Tsakopoulos's challenge to Corps' Administrative Order).
36. See id. (noting Tsakopoulos's main argument). Tsakopoulos also argued
that the Corps' guidance letter was invalid because it was a "substantive rule that
required notice-and-comment rule making." Id. at 813 n.1. The Ninth Circuit,
however, did not consider this argument because it was not made in the district
court. Id.
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alties based on Tsakopoulos's alleged CWA violations.3 7 The District Court for the Eastern District of California determined that
the Corps had jurisdiction over deep ripping.3 8 The district court
then held a bench trial to resolve whether Tsakopoulos had engaged in deep ripping.3 9 In the fall of 1999, the district court concluded that Tsakopoulos had engaged in deep ripping on 348 sepa40
rate occasions, violating the CWA.
In response, Tsakopoulos appealed the district court's decision
to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 4' The Ninth Circuit upheld
the district court's decision, agreeing that the Corps and EPA had
jurisdictional authority over deep ripping.4 2 The Ninth Circuit,
however, reversed the district court's ruling that a particular isolated vernal pool on the Borden Ranch land was a "wetland" under
the CWA. 43 In December of 2002, the Supreme Court, in an equal44
ly divided decision, affirmed the Ninth Circuit's ruling.
III.

A.

BACKGROUND

The Clean Water Act

Section 404(a) of the CWA empowers the Army Corps of Engineers to issue permits pursuant to section 301 (a) of the CWA for
regulating discharge of pollutants into the "navigable waters" of the
United States. 45 The CWA defines "navigable waters" as waters that
37. Borden, 261 F.3d at 813 (explaining government's response to Tsakopoulos's lawsuit). Both parties filed for summary judgment in the case. Id.
38. See generally Borden Ranch P'ship v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs,
No. CIV. S97-0858 GEBJFM, WL 1797329, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 1999) (holding
that Tsakopoulos's deep ripping violated CWA). The district court concluded that
a civil trial was necessary to determine whether and where deep ripping occurred.
See Borden, 261 F.3d at 813 (giving procedural history of case).
39. Borden, 261 F.3d at 813. (detailing findings of evidence of repeated
violations).
40. See id. (detailing findings of deep ripping violations). The district court
offered Tsakopoulos the option of paying the corresponding $1.5 million penalty
or paying $500,000 if he mitigated damages by restoring four acres of wetland. Id.
41. See id. (discussing process by which case reached Ninth Circuit).
42. See id. (affirming that Corps had jurisdiction in wetlands of Borden
Ranch).

43. Id. at 810 (affirming in part and reversing in part). For a discussion of the
court's complete holding, see infra notes 92-122 and accompanying text.
44. See generally Borden Ranch P'ship v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 537
U.S. 99, 100 (2002) (per curiam) (affirming Ninth Circuit by split 4-4 decision with

Justice Kennedy abstaining).
45. Clean Water Act § 404(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a), (d) (2001); § 301(a), 33
U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2001) (outlining scope of Corps' authority to issue permits).
The provisions clarify that the Corps may issue permits "for the discharge of
dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at specified disposal sites." 33
U.S.C. § 1344(a).
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are in some way related to use in interstate or foreign commerce,
including interstate wetlands. 46 "Wetlands" are defined as lands
covered by enough water that, under normal circumstances, would
47
support vegetation typically found in saturated soil conditions.
1.

Navigable Waters

Courts generally take an expansive view of the term "navigable
waters. " 48 The Supreme Court extended the definition of navigable
waters and waterways to include certain wetlands adjacent to navigable waters in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.49 Recently
however, the Supreme Court limited the expansion of the Corps'
authority over wetlands in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County
v. United States Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC) 0 . In SWANCC, the
Supreme Court held that the Corps exceeded its authority when it
defined intrastate waters used as habitats for migratory birds as
"navigable waters" under the CWA. 51 Furthermore, the Court
distinguished its earlier holding in Riverside because the waters at
issue in that case actually abutted a navigable waterway, whereas in
52
SWANCC, they did not.

46. Navigation and National Waters, 33 C.F.R. 328.3(a)(1)-(2) (2002). Navigable waters are defined as "waters which are currently used, or were used in the
past, or may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce including...
interstate wetlands." Id.; see also Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United
States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2000) (limiting scope of "navigable
waters").
47. 33 C.F.R. 328.3(b). The Code of Federal Regulations defines "wetlands"
as "those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a
frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions." Id.
48. Rachel Glickman et al., Environmental Crimes, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 413,
431 (Spring 2003) [hereinafter Environmental Crimes] (noting courts' historically
broad construction of term "navigable waters").
49. 474 U.S. 121, 133-35 (1985) (holding that expanding definition of "navigable waters" to particular wetlands adjacent to navigable waterways is "a permissible interpretation of the Act").
50. 531 U.S. 159, 165-68 (2001) (refusing to expand Corps' 404jurisdiction to
wetlands not connected to open water).
51. Id. at 167 (holding that Congress did not intend to extend Corps' authority to non-navigable waters not adjacent to any actually navigable waters).
52. Id. at 167-68 (distinguishing its earlier holding in Riverside because waterway in SWANCC did not abut any navigable waterway); see also Riverside, 474 U.S. at
133. The Court in SWANCC further limited Riverside by recognizing that Riverside
interpreted the term "navigable" beyond its classical understanding. SWANCC, 531
U.S. at 171.
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Discharge of a Pollutant

Under the CWA, discharging pollutants into wetlands without
a permit is illegal. 5 3 The CWA defines "discharge" as "any addition
54
of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source."
Courts have experienced difficulty in determining whether land
that is stirred and then returned to approximately the same area
55
may be considered an "addition of a pollutant" under the CWA.
Courts frequently disagree over what activities cause the "discharge of a pollutant."5 6 For example, in Rybachek v. United States
Environmental Protection Agency, 57 the Ninth Circuit held that dis58
charge from mining constituted an "addition of a pollutant."

Rybachek involved soil that miners dug up, processed to remove valuable deposits and later returned to the wetland from which it was
taken. 59 In contrast, in National Mining Association v. United States
Army Corps of Engineers,60 the D.C. Circuit ruled that "discharge of a
pollutant" did not include material that incidentally fell back into
the wetlands in the course of dredging operations. 6 1 Further, the
D.C. Circuit determined that the Corps exceeded its authority by
62
regulating this conduct.

53. Clean Water Act § 301(a), (d), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a), (d); Clean Water Act
§ 404(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2001). For a further discussion of what may be
considered discharge of a pollutant, see infra notes 54-67 and accompanying text.
54. Clean Water Act § 502(12), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (A) (defining discharge
of pollutants).
55. Borden Ranch P'ship v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 261 F.3d 810, 81415 (9th Cir. 2001) (comparing deep ripping to mining and dredging activities).
This controversy is discussed at greater length at notes 56-67 and 132-39 and accompanying text.
56. See generally Nat'l. Mining Ass'n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 145 F.3d
1399 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (refusing to extend Corp's authority to incidental fallback
from dredging); United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding
that Corps does not have authority to regulate sidecasting); Rybachek v. United
States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 904 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that mining
caused discharge of pollutant).
57. 904 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1990) (considering whether mining activity constituted discharge of pollutant).
58. See id. at 1285 (holding that sifting through soil from riverbed for gold
and returning soil to riverbed qualifies as "addition of a pollutant").
59. See id. (discussing process by which soil was mined, processed and then
returned to same area).
60. 145 F.3d 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that Corps exceeded its authority
by regulating incidental fallback from dredging activities).
61. See id. at 1404 (noting that "addition" could not mean instance where
small portion of excavated material fell back from where it was taken).
62. Id. (finding that Corps had no authority to regulate such incidental
fallback).
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There is also evidence of internal dispute in the Fourth Circuit
over what activities cause the "addition of a pollutant." 6 In United
States v. Wilson,64 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that
"sidecasting," a process whereby material is removed from a ditch
and placed by the side of the ditch, was not a "discharge of a pollutant" under the CWA. 6 5 Three years later, the Fourth Circuit held

that the deposit of dredged or excavated material from a wetland
back into that same wetland "added a pollutant where none had
been before" in United States v. Deaton.66 The court reasoned that
"Congress determined that plain dirt, once excavated from waters
of the United States, could not be redeposited into those waters
67
without causing harm to the environment."
3.

Point Source

A "point source" under the CWA is "any discernable, confined
and discrete conveyance . .. from which pollutants are or may be

discharged." 68 Although many courts have held that bulldozers and
backhoes are point sources, there is still some debate over whether
a plow is a point source. 69 In Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v.
Marsh,70 the Fifth Circuit held that bulldozers and backhoes were
63. See generally United States v. Deaton, 209 F.3d 331, 335-36 (4th Cir. 2000)
(holding dredging technique called sidecasting constituted addition of pollutant);
Cf United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding that Corps does not
have authority to regulate sidecasting).
64. 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997) (refusing to hold that sidecasting constituted
discharge of pollutant).
65. See id at 253-54 (arguing that such holding was overextension of powers of
CWA).
66. 209 F.3d 331, 335-36 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that dredging technique
called sidecasting constituted addition of pollutant). Sidecasting involves dredging soil from a location and immediately placing the same, unprocessed soil
nearby. Id.
67. Id. at 336 (reasoning that Congress had mandated that once soil was removed from wetland it could not be returned to wetland without adding pollutant). The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals later reaffirmed that the Corps had
power to regulate sidecasting in a later incarnation of the Deaton case. See generally
Deaton v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 332 F.3d 698, 702 (4th Cir. 2003) (affirming district court's order requiring Deaton to fill in ditch and restore wetlands
to pre-violation condition).
68. Clean Water Act § 502(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2001) (offering indistinct definition of point source).
69. Borden Ranch P'ship v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 261 F.3d 810, 815
(9th Cir. 2001) (noting controversy in Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v.
Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 922 (5th Cir. 1983)).
70. 715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1983) (finding that deforesting land constituted
discharge of pollutant).
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considered point sources capable of discharging pollutants. 7 1 In
Avoyelles, the court determined that deforesting a large area of land
with bulldozers and backhoes for the purpose of growing soybeans
cofistituted the discharge of a pollutant from a point source. 72 Un73
til Borden, no court had held a plow to be a point source.
4.

The Normal FarmingException

The CWA excludes discharges "from normal farming ... and

ranching activities, such as plowing," from its regulation.7 4 This
farming exception is very narrow and cannot be applied to any use
not already in existence. 75 The exemption is specifically limited by
a "recapture provision," which significantly restricts application of
the exemption because it requires a permit for any discharge result76
ing from a change in the land's use.

The "recapture provision" seemingly allows the Corps and EPA
to regulate even normal plowing activities if the plowing changes
the use of the land. 77 A broader concern in this area is whether

normal plowing of a field could be deemed to bring the land into
another use "to which it was not previously subject" under the statute. 78 As the Ninth Circuit held in United States v. Akers, 79 the Corps
does not have authority to regulate a farmer who desires only to
change the use of his land from growing one wetland crop to another.8 0 The Corps may, however, regulate activities that require
substantial hydrological alterations. 8 ' According to the Ninth Cir71. Id. at 922 (holding that bulldozer could be considered point source under

CWA).
72. See id. at 900-01 (holding that deforesting land created pollutant and,
therefore, required permit).
73. See generally Borden, 261 F.3d at 815 (acknowledging Tsakopoulos's contention that no court has held plow to be point source).
74. Clean Water Act § 404(f), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f) (1) (A) (2001) (providing
for "normal farming" exception to CWA).
75. See EPA Fact Sheet, Exemptions to Section 404 Permit Requirements, at
www.epa.gov/OWOW/wetlands/facts/factl0.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2004) (discussing generally activities exempt from permit requirement).
76. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f) (2) (stating that permit is required when discharge of
pollutant is "incidental to any activity having as its purpose bringing an area of the
navigable waters into a use to which it was not previously subject").
77. Id. (providing that plowing may be regulated where "flow of circulation of
navigable waters may be impaired").
78. See Borden, 261 F.3d at 815-16 (attempting to resolve whether normal plowing may fall under "recapture provision").
79. 785 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1986) (addressing scope of normal farming
exception).
80. See id. at 820 (reasoning that Congress did not intend such result).
81. See id. at 822-23 (holding that major conversion from wetlands to dry lands
requires Corps permit).
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cuit in Akers, Congress intended to enact the CWA to "prevent con82
version of wetlands to dry lands."

B.

The Commerce Clause
1. The Scope of Regulatory Authority Under the Commerce Clause

The United States Supreme Court has long acknowledged the
regulatory power given by Congress to administrative agencies such
as the Corps and EPA.8 3 The source of these agencies' authority
arises from the Commerce Clause, through which Congress delegates powers to the agencies.8 4 Courts have traditionally construed
the term "navigable waters" very broadly.8 5 Under the Commerce
Clause, the federal government has power to regulate in three areas. 86 As set forth in United States v. Morrison,8 7 the three areas of
permissible regulation are: (1) "channels" of interstate commerce;
(2) "instrumentalities" of interstate commerce; and (3) those activi88
ties "having a substantial relation to interstate commerce."
2.

The Scope of Agency Authority After SWANCC

The Supreme Court's decision in SWANCC significantly nar-

rowed the traditionally broad definition of the term "navigable waters." 89 In SWANCC, the Supreme Court held that the Corps had
exceeded its authority by regulating in non-navigable waters that
were home to migratory birds. 90 The Court in SWANCC also held
82. See id. at 822 (interpreting Congressional intent in enacting CWA).
83. See generally Brief of Amici Curiae Pacific Legal Foundation, et al. at *17,
Borden Ranch P'ship v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 261 F.3d 810 (9th Cir. 2001)(No. 0015700) (outlining traditional scope of administrative agencies' authority under
Commerce Clause).
84. U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting power to regulate commerce among
"the several states").
85. Environmental Crimes, supra note 48, at 431 (noting that courts have
"broadly construed the term 'navigable waters' to include all bodies of water that
could be regulated by Congress under the Commerce Clause").
86. See generally United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608-09 (2000); see also
generally United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995) (outlining traditional
sources of authority for federal government under Commerce Clause).
87. 529 U.S. at 608-09 (outlining test for Commerce Clause authority).
88. Id. (relying on United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)) (outlining
boundaries of Commerce Clause).
89. Environmental Crimes, supra note 48, at 431 (noting that "courts have
broadly construed the term 'navigable waters' to include all bodies of water that
could be regulated by Congress under the Commerce Clause"); see also SWANCC,
531 U.S. 159, 170-74 (2000) (dealing with split in circuits as to extent of Commerce power of Corps and outlining federal authority to regulate in non-navigable
waters).
90. See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172 (holding that Corps' authority did not extend to isolated pond solely because it was habitat for migratory birds).
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that federal jurisdiction did not extend to either seasonal ponds or
wetlands that lie entirely within the borders of one state and are not
adjacent to any navigable waters. 9 '
IV.

NARRATIVE ANALYsIs

A. The Majority
1. Jurisdiction
The majority began its analysis by examining whether the
Corps had jurisdiction over deep ripping. 92 The court generally deferred to the Corps' findings that the swales and drainages on the
former ranchland were wetlands. 93 Following Riverside, the court
reasoned that the definition of navigable waters extended to waters
adjacent to navigable waters. 94 The court found, however, that one
not a wetland; thereof the ranchland's isolated vernal pools was
95
fore, the Corps had no jurisdiction there.
2. Discharge of a Pollutant
Next, the Ninth Circuit examined what constituted the discharge of a pollutant.9 6 Tsakopoulos argued that merely turning
91. See id. at 171-72 (narrowing Corps' regulatory authority). Prior to this decision, the Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Wilson, questioned whether "waters of
the United States" included non-navigable waters. See United States v. Wilson, 133
F.3d 251, 256-57 (4th Cir. 1997) (suggesting that power to regulate non-navigable
waters might arise from instrumentalities of interstate commerce).
92. See Borden Ranch P'ship v. United States Army Corps' of Eng'rs,261 F.3d at 81316 (9th Cir. 2001) (addressing whether Corps' authority extended to deep ripping
process).
93. See id. at 813-14 (agreeing with Corps that Borden Ranch contained significant areas of wetland). Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit did not offer any further
proof of the findings of "wetlands" and made no reference to the "Chevron Doctrine", which is commonly understood to justify deference of the court to agency
findings in certain situations. Id. at 813-15; see generally Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (delineating twopart test for determining when deference to administrative agencies is appropriate). As the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals noted in Deaton v. Chesapeake Bay
Found., Inc., "when 'an administrative interpretation of a statute invokes the outer
limits of Congress' power,' the interpretation is not entitled to deference under
Chevron... unless Congress gave 'a clear indication that [it] intended that result.'"
332 F.3d 698, 705 (quoting SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172).
94. Borden, 261 F.3d at 814 (holding that "the nation's waters ... include
wetlands adjacent to navigable waters") (citing United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 133-35 (1985)).
95. Id. at 816 (holding that one isolated pool could not be considered
wetland).
96. See id. at 814-15 (examining past court holdings as to what constitutes
pollutant).
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over soil with a plow was not an "addition of a pollutant."9 7 The
Court of Appeals disagreed and held that the CWA governed any
activity damaging the ecology of wetlands. 98 The court likened
Tsakopoulos's practice of deep ripping to the mining activities that
the Ninth Circuit held to be a discharge of a pollutant in RVbachek. 99
Analogizing deep ripping to sidecasting, the Ninth Circuit relied
heavily on the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in Deaton. 0 0 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the deep ripping on Borden Ranch was a discharge of a pollutant. 10 1
3. Point Source
Tsakopoulos further defended his position by arguing that no
court had ever considered a plow to be a point source; therefore,
the court could not hold his deep ripping activities to be a point
source. 10

2

The Ninth Circuit disagreed.10 3 The court concluded

that, because bulldozers and backhoes were considered point
sources in Avoyelles, deep ripping (which uses a tractor or bulldozer
10 4
to pull metal prongs through the soil) was also a point source.
4.

The Normal FarmingException

The court then considered whether Tsakopoulous's activities
at Borden Ranch were exempt under the CWA's normal farming
exception. 10 5 In holding that deep ripping should not fall under
97. See id. at 814 (arguing that plow was not point source). Although he did

not make the following argument to the court, Mr. Tsakopoulos is quoted elsewhere as saying it is a "sin to call God's gift, soil, a pollutant." See David Kravets,
Nation's High Court to Consider Oversight of Farm Plowing, EARTHBOUND FARMs NEWS,
at http://www.earthboundfarm.com/news-world/PlowFine.html (Dec. 7, 2002)
(discussing facts of Borden).
98. Borden, 261 F.3d at 814-15 (reasoning that "activities that destroy the ecology of a wetland are not immune from the Clean Water Act" simply because those
activities do not introduce foreign materials).
99. See id. (holding that deep ripping violated CWA in same fashion as mining
activities).
100. See id. Sidecasting, the technique held to cause an addition of a pollutant in Deaton, is a technique in which dredged materials from a wetland are deposited back into to the same wetland. Id.
101. See id. at 815 (holding that "deep ripping, when undertaken in the context at issue here, can constitute a discharge of a pollutant under the Clean Water
Act").
102. See id. (arguing that prohibited discharge must come from point source).
103. Borden, 261 F.3d at 815 (rejecting argument that deep ripping could not
be point source).
104. Id. (relying on Avoyelles, 715 F.2d at 922). The court argued that it could
"think of no reason" why using bulldozers and tractors to pull large metal prongs
through the soil "would not satisfy the definition of a 'point source."' Id.
105. See id. at 815-16 (examining normal farming exception of CWA).
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the normal farming exception, the court closely examined the statutory language and relied on the exemption's "recapture provision."'106 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that, because "even normal
plowing can be regulated" under the CWA's recapture provision,
the Corps had jurisdiction to regulate a more invasive process such
as deep ripping. 10 7 Further, the court held that changing the use
of the land from ranchland to orchards and vineyards sufficiently
10 8
changed the land's purpose.
B.

The Dissent

In his dissent, Judge Ronald Gould argued that the majority's
holding was an "undue stretch" of Congressional intent because it
overextended the powers of the Corps and EPA by allowing them to
regulate normal farming activities. 10 9 Judge Gould asserted that
Congress never intended for normal farming activities, such as
plowing, to fall within the CWA's authority.1 ' 0 He stated, "the crux
of this case is that a farmer has plowed deeply to improve his farm
property."111 Further, he noted that he would have followed the
holding of National Miningand ruled that deep ripping did not constitute a discharge of a pollutant.1 12 In Judge Gould's view, deep
ripping did not "involve any significant removal or 'addition' of material to the site," and therefore, the majority should not have con13
sidered it to be an addition of a pollutant.
Judge Gould further contended that the majority incorrectly
focused on the changes in the land's hydrological structure. 114 He
106. See id. (reasoning that deep ripping impaired flow of nearby navigable

waters and thereby altered hydrological state of land).
107. Id. (expanding Corps'jurisdiction to regulate even normal farming activ-

ities that fall under recapture provision).
108. Borden, 261 F.3d at 815 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(2) (2001)).

The

court reasoned that "[c] onverting ranch land into orchards and vineyards is clearly
bringing the land 'into a use to which it was not previously subject.'" Id.
109. See id. at 819-20 (Gould, J., dissenting) (arguing that such extension of

power was never intended by Congress).
110. See id. (Gould, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress could have explicitly extended jurisdiction of Corps to normal farming activities had it so desired).
111. Id. at 819 (Gould, J., dissenting) (arguing that majority's holding intrudes directly into traditional farming activities).
112. Id. (Gould, J., dissenting) (referring to National Mining, which rejected

Corps' contention that incidental fallback is "addition of a pollutant"). For a more
complete discussion of National Mining, see supra notes 60-62 and accompanying

text.
113. SeeBorden, 261 F.3d at 820 (GouldJ., dissenting) (arguing that ground is
plowed and transformed, but no soil is added or removed).
114. Id. (Gould, J., dissenting) (contending that addition of pollutants was
focus of CWA, not hydrological nature of soil).
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argued that the majority improperly justified its holding on the basis of the hydrological alteration of the soil because Congress did
not intend this to be the focus of the CWA. 115 Judge Gould argued
that Congress spoke "in terms of discharge or addition of pollutants, not in terms of change of the hydrological nature of the soil,"
and that it was, therefore, improper to decide the case on the issue
of a hydrological change in the soil.116
Next, Judge Gould distinguished the precedent on which the
majority relied.1 17 Judge Gould distinguished Rybachek on factual
grounds and noted that the disputed "pollutant" in that case was
first processed and then added back into the soil; whereas, in Borden, the soil was merely turned over.11 8 He distinguished Deaton by
arguing the sidecasting activities in that case were not analogous to
the deep ripping process at issue in Borden, which merely turned
over the soil and did not dredge or excavate any material. 119
Judge Gould additionally maintained that the court should
consider all plowing, including deep ripping, to be a normal farming activity under the CWA and should not require a permit. 120 He
further criticized the majority's holding because he believed it qualified as judicial law-making. 12 1 Finally, Judge Gould asserted that
policy decisions, such as how far the normal farming exception ex122
tends, should be left to the judgment of the legislature.

115. Id. at 819-20 (Gould, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress's focus was

purely on addition of pollutants).
116. Id. (GouldJ., dissenting) (arguing that change in hydrological nature of
soil was not intended focus of CWA).
117. See id. at 820-21 (Gould, J., dissenting) (distinguishing Rybachek and
Deaton).
118. Borden, 261 F.3d at 820 (Gould, J., dissenting) (distinguishing Rybachek
on grounds that soil was altered by mining process before being returned to

wetlands).
119. Id. (Gould, J., dissenting) (distinguishing Deaton on grounds that plowing is less involved process than dredging).
120. See id. at 820 (Gould, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress intended all
forms of plowing to fall within normal farming exception).
121. See id. at 821 (Gould, J., dissenting) (arguing that majority's holding
"goes beyond mere statutory interpretation").
122. Id. (Gould, J., dissenting) (arguing that majority extends itself too far by
making policy decisions).
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A.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

The Expansion of the Corps' Authority
1.

The Court's Inconsistent Expansion of "Navigable Waters"

The Ninth Circuit's broad definition of "navigable waterways"
is inconsistent with recent Supreme Court precedent that has prohibited such expansion. 123 The Borden court appeared to completely defer to the finding of the Corps and the trial court that
large portions of the land at issue were "wetlands" within the definition of navigable waters, and, therefore, within the Corps' jurisdiction. 124 One commentator noted that "It]he Corps and EPA have
gone a step further and defined waters to include even isolated wetlands . . .like vernal pools and drainage swales."'125 The court's
finding in Borden, that one vernal pool was too isolated to be considered "navigable water," raises the question of whether the rest of
the "wetlands," such as the drainage swales, were in any significant
126
way connected to the nation's "navigable waters."'
The Ninth Circuit's reliance on Riverside was unwarranted because that case did not extend the CWA's jurisdiction to isolated
wetlands not adjacent to navigable waterways. 127 As the Supreme
Court subsequently noted, Riverside "did not 'express any opinion'
on the 'question of the authority of the Corps to regulate discharges of fill material into wetlands that are not adjacent to bodies
of open water."'1 28 Further, in SWANCC, the Supreme Court held
that the CWA did not extend to waters that are "not adjacent to
open water." 129 The Ninth Circuit seemingly ignored the holding
of SWANCC, which determined that extending federal jurisdiction
to non-navigable waters not adjacent to navigable waters exceeded
123. See generally SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159 (2000) (holding that Corps' jurisdiction did not extend to pools in gravel pits).
124. See Borden, 261 F.3d at 816 (holding that only one isolated vernal pool on
all ranch property could not be considered wetlands).
125. Brief of Pacific Legal Foundation, supra note 83, at *8 (arguing for limitation of Corps' authority).
126. Borden, 261 F.3d at 816 (finding that only one pool on all ranchland
could not be considered navigable waters). The other areas of water that the court
found to be "navigable waters" included "widely dispersed seasonal drainage swales
and intermittent drainages ubiquitous on farms and ranches of any size" which
"exist ephemerally and carry stormwat& runoff for brief periods only during and
after California's seasonal winter rains." Coon, supra note 6, at 6.
127. See generally SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 170-72 (limiting holding in Riverside by
requiring that waters must be adjacent to navigable waters).
128. Id. at 167-68 (quoting Riverside, 474 U.S. at 131-32 n.8).
129. Id. at 168 ("In order to rule for respondents here, we would have to hold
that the jurisdiction of the Corps extends to ponds that are not adjacent to open
water. But we conclude that the text of the [CWA] will not allow this.").
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the Corps' authority. 130 While the Borden court cursorily addressed
SWANCC in its discussion, it nevertheless held that the certain isolated waters on the Borden Ranch should be considered navigable
131
waters under the Corps' jurisdiction.
2.

The Court's Analogy to Mining and Dredging

In holding that the mining techniques at issue in Rybachek were
32
comparable to deep ripping, the court used a strained analogy.'
The Borden court reasoned that deep ripping, where soil is merely
turned over, was an "addition of a pollutant" comparable to mining
activities in which soil is removed from a stream bed, sifted through
133
for valuable deposits and then returned to the stream bed.
There are also some shortcomings in the court's argument that
sidecasting and plowing are essentially the same. 134 The Ninth Circuit in Borden compared deep ripping to sidecasting, which, according to Deaton, was an addition of a pollutant. 3 5 In sidecasting,
dredged or excavated material is redeposited in or near the wetland
from which it was extracted. 13 6 Courts have held that sidecasting
adds a pollutant because it dredges up material and deposits it
137
in a nearby location, thereby adding a pollutant to that location.
Other courts, such as the Fourth Circuit in Wilson, have challenged
whether sidecasting can be considered an "addition" at all because
no new material is added.' 3 8 Furthermore, as Judge Gould argued
in his dissent, plowing, in which the ground is merely turned over
and left in nearly the identical spot from which it was taken, bears
130. Id. at 172-74. For a more complete discussion of SWANCC, see supra
notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
131. See generally Borden, 261 F.3d at 812-19 (holding that lands should be considered wetlands under CWA).
132. Id. at 814. For a more complete discussion of the holdings of Rybachek,
see supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
133. See Borden, 261 F.3d at 814 (relying on Rybachek v. United States, 904 F.2d
1276 (9th Cir. 1990)).
134. Id. at 820 (Gould, J., dissenting) (arguing that sidecasting is not compa-

rable to plowing technique such as deep ripping).
135. United States v. Deaton, 209 F.3d 331, 332-33 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding
sidecasting to be discharge of pollutant).
136. Id. at 335-37 (describing practice of sidecasting and holding it to constitute "addition of a pollutant").
137. See id. at 335-36 (determining that redepositing dredged material into

same wetland constitutes "addition of a pollutant").
138. See United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 259-60 (holding that because no
new material was added when soil was merely turned aside, that sidecasting could
not constitute "addition" of pollutant). Cf Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v.
Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 923 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that "addition," as included in
definition of "discharge," could include "redeposit" of dredged material, which
need not come from outside source).
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only a slight resemblance to sidecasting, in which the soil is
dredged and actually removed and placed somewhere else in the
139
wetland.
3.

Transformation of the Land

The majority also held that deep ripping converted the land to
a use to which it was not previously subject. 140 In doing so, the
majority may have focused too heavily on the transformation of the
use of the land from ranchlands to vineyards as a conversion from
wetlands to dry lands. 141 As Judge Gould suggested, the court
should have focused on whether a pollutant is added to the land,
which was more in accord with the legislative intent behind the
CWA. 142 Therefore, the court should not regard plowing as a sub143
stantial hydrological alteration.
B.

The Overextension of the Commerce Clause

The Corps and EPA have long enjoyed extensive regulatory
power over certain activities in the nation's waterways. 144 Nevertheless, the question arises whether the government has power under
the Commerce Clause to control the plowing of completely isolated
wetlands.1 45 In its Amicus Brief filed on behalf of Tsakopoulos, the
Pacific Legal Foundation heavily criticized this extension of authority as an abuse of the already broad latitude regulatory agencies possess under the Commerce Clause. 1 46 As the Pacific Legal Foundation argued, the government failed to show an actual connection or
substantial effect on interstate commerce that would give them the
14 7
underlying authority to regulate the land on Borden Ranch.
139. See Borden, 261 F.3d at 820 (Gould, J., dissenting) (arguing that plowing

should never be considered "addition of.a pollutant").
140. See id. at 815-16 (relying on United States v. Akers, 785 F.2d 814, 820 (9th
Cir. 1986)).
141. See id. (holding that because deep ripping had effect of converting land
from wetlands to drylands, activity could not fall within normal farming
exception).
142. Id. at 820 (Gould, J., dissenting) (noting that deep ripping "does not
involve any significant removal or 'addition' of material to the site").
143. See id. (Gould, J., dissenting) (arguing that all forms of plowing should
fall within normal farming exception).
144. For a more complete discussion of the Corps' and EPA's regulatory
power in the nation's waterways, see supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
145. See Brief of Pacific Legal Foundation, supra note 83, at *15-18 (questioning limits of authority of Corps under Commerce Clause).
146. See id. (remarking that Commerce Clause cannot extend to isolated, intrastate waterways).
147. Id. at *17-18 (arguing that Commerce Clause does not grant Corps authority over completely isolated wetlands).
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In its analysis in Borden, the Ninth Circuit failed to fully consider whether the Corps' regulatory actions were justified under the
Commerce Clause test outlined in Morrison.148 Applying the threeprong Morrisontest to Borden, it does not appear that the Commerce
Clause extends to plowing activities. 149 First, the Ninth Circuit offered no proof that the waters in Borden had any substantial connection to the nation's waterways. 150 Therefore, the waterways cannot
15 1
be considered one of the "channels" of interstate commerce.
Second, the waterways are not "instrumentalities" of interstate com15 2
merce because they serve no function in interstate commerce.
Finally, Tsakopoulos's deep ripping was never shown to have any
"substantial relation to interstate commerce." 5 3
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Wilson similarly concluded that extending the CWA's power to isolated wetlands not
adjacent to navigable waters was an overextension of the Commerce
Clause. 15 4 The court in Wilson held that the Corps exceeded its
authority under the Commerce Clause by enacting regulations that
defined navigable waters as any waters that "could affect" interstate
commerce. 155 Therefore, plowing has no effect on interstate commerce, especially in isolated, intrastate wetlands, and should not be
56
regulated under the CWA.1

148. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608-09 (2000) (outlining three
possible sources of Commerce Clause authority).
149. See id. (outlining Commerce Clause analysis). See also Brief of Pacific Legal Foundation, supra note 83, at *16-18 (arguing that Commerce Clause cannot
extend to plowing activities).
150. See Brief of Pacific Legal Foundation, supra note 83, at *15-16 (arguing
that Corps' authority under section 404(a) of CWA should not extend to wetlands
completely isolated from any navigable waters).
151. Id. (maintaining that waters of Borden Ranch cannot be considered
channels of interstate commerce). But see Deaton v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 332
F.3d 698, 706 (4th Cir. 2003) ("The power over navigable waters is an aspect of the
authority to regulate the channels of interstate commerce.").
152. See Brief of Pacific Legal Foundation, supra note 83, at *15-16 (arguing
that waters of Borden Ranch are not instrumentalities).
153. Id. (arguing there is no substantial connection to interstate commerce in
deep plowing).
154. Wilson, 133 F.3d at 255-56 (holding that waters must be adjacent to navigable waters to allow regulation under CWA).
155. Id. at 256-57 (holding that 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (3) (1993), which defined
waters of the United States to include those waters whose degradation "could affect" interstate commerce was unauthorized by CWA as limited by Commerce
Clause and was therefore invalid).
156. See Brief of Pacific Legal Foundation, supra note 83, at *15-16 (arguing
that court could not reasonably interpret intrastate wetlands to be related to interstate commerce).
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IMPACT

The significance of the Supreme Court's affirmance of the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Borden lies in the extension of power it
could possibly grant to EPA and the Corps over the normal plowing
activities of the nation's farmers. 15 7 Although the Supreme Court's
decision has precedential effect only in the Ninth Circuit where the
case arose, if the Court continues to affirm decisions that expand
the power of the Corps and EPA, it could impose severe regulatory
15 8
burdens on the average farmer.

By extending the definition of "navigable waters" under the
CWA to include completely isolated wetlands, the Ninth Circuit
greatly expands the Corps' power and brings entirely new areas of
regulation within the purview of the Corps' jurisdiction to regulate.1 59 The majority of the Ninth Circuit in Borden largely ignored
the traditional limits of the Commerce Clause and the possible
ramifications of its holding on "normal" farmers.' 60 In his dissent,
Judge Gould strongly argued against such a broad grant of power,
contending that Congress did not mean to absolutely prohibit all
activities by farmers that could possibly change the hydrological
make-up of their land. 16 1 Moreover, as Judge Gould noted, the majority opinion has the effect of making the new law that a plow may
be considered a point source. 162 Such a holding is tantamount to
judicial legislating and should not be permitted. 163
Finally, because the implications of the Ninth Circuit's holding
are so broad, the court should have exercised more caution in expanding the jurisdiction of the Corps and EPA. 164 As Judge Gould
remarked, had Congress intended to concern itself with the normal
157. See Coon, supra note 6, at 6 (discussing possible ramifications of Court's
holding).
158. See generally id. at 43 (noting regulatory nightmare that could result if
CWA is extended to proscribe activities of normal farmers).
159. See id. at 6-7 (remarking on ramifications of new expansive reading of

"navigable waters").

160. Borden, 261 F.3d at 819 (Gould, J., dissenting) (arguing that "crux" of
matter was that "a farmer has plowed deeply to improve his farm").
161. Id. at 821 (Gould,J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress "did not literally
prohibit any conduct by farmers or ranchers that changes the hydrological character of their land").
162. Id. (Gould, J., dissenting) (arguing that "the majority opinion ...makes
new law by concluding that a plow is a point source and that deep ripping includes
discharge of pollutants into protected waters").
163. Id. at 819-21 (Gould, J., dissenting) (arguing that majority exceeded its
authority).
164. See generally id. at 820-21 (Gould, J., dissenting) (arguing that court
should have exercised more caution in considering extent of its holding).
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plowing activities of farmers, it could have explicitly regulated such
farmers should be left to
activity. 165 The power to regulate small
166
courts.
the
to
not
and
the legislature
Adam Gerber
165. Borden, 261 F.3d at 820 (Gould, J., dissenting) (arguing that plowing of
any sort should be considered normal farming activity and should not be regulated
by CWA).
166. See generally id. at 821 (Gould, J., dissenting) (arguing that policy decision
should be made by Congress and that alternative would allow either "an agency
power too unbounded" or, worse, "judicial law-making").
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